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Bonabeau model on a fully connected graph
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Numerical simulations are reported on the Bonabeau model on a fully connected graph, where
spatial degrees of freedom are absent. The control parameter is the memory factor f . The phase
transition is observed at the dispersion of the agents power hi. The critical value fC shows a
hysteretic behavior with respect to the initial distribution of hi. fC decreases with the system size;
this decrease can be compensated by a greater number of fights between a global reduction of the
distribution width of hi. The latter step is equivalent to a partial forgetting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The game theory is considered to be mathematical for-
mulation of theory of conflicts [1]. Since its initialization
by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1946 [2], it becomes
a powerful branch of knowledge, with numerous links to
other areas of science. Offering new insight into old prob-
lems, these links allow to widen our perspective to new
interdisciplinary applications.
Such is the concept of self-organizing hierarchies in an-
imal societies, introduced by Bonabeau et al. in 1995 [3]
(see Refs. [4, 5, 6] for the most recent results and Ref. [7]
for reviews). In the Bonabeau model, N agents walk ran-
domly on a given area and fight when they met. Initially,
the outcome of fights is random. However, agents are able
to remember for some time their past results and this
memory influences their subsequent fights. Then, there
are two competitive mechanisms. First, each fight influ-
ences the agents’ power: winner is stronger and looser is
weaker, what alters the probabilities of winning of their
future fights. Second, the information of these alterations
is gradually erased. As a consequence, a phase transition
can be observed: for a given velocity of forgetting, fre-
quent fights produce a hierarchy of permanent winners
and permanent loosers. This hierarchy is maintained in
time. However, if fights are rare, the hierarchy is being
forgotten quicker, than it is reproduced. The frequency
of fights depends on the number of fighters on a given
area. The order parameter is the dispersion of power
of the agents, or the dispersion of probabilities of win-
ning/loosing of pairs of agents. The phase transition was
termed in [5] as the one between hierarchical and egal-
itarian society. Besides its sociological associations, the
Bonabeau model offers nontrivial dynamics of a specific,
time-dependent spontaneous symmetry breaking, which
— in our opinion — deserves attention from a theoretical
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point of view. Unfortunately, numerical experiments de-
scribed in Ref. [5] have shown that the order and even the
appearance of the phase transition depends on a direct
way of forgetting, i.e. the time dependence of the agents’
power, and on the presence of mean-field-like coupling
which is absent in Ref. [3].
A reasonable strategy of resolving this puzzle seems
to separate it to elements as simple as possible, and to
observe their properties. Here we propose a formulation
where the spatial coordinates of agents are absent. In-
stead, the agents are placed at nodes of a fully connected
graph, i.e. each agent can meet every other agent. Scale
free networks were mentioned in [6]. In next section the
applied procedure is described in detail. Numerical re-
sults are reported and concluded in two subsequent sec-
tions.
II. THE MODEL
Two fighters i and j are selected randomly from a pop-
ulation of N agents. The probability that i-th agent wins
over j-th is
P (i, j, t) =
1
1 + exp{σ(t)[hj(t)− hi(t)]}
(1)
where hi is the power of i-th agent at time t and
σ2(t) = 〈h2i (t)〉 − 〈hi(t)〉
2, (2)
where 〈· · · 〉 is the average over N agents. As an output
of the fight, the power hi of the winner increases by ε
and the one of the looser decreases by ε.
Every Nf steps (i.e. fights), the powers hi of all agents
are multiplied by the factor (1 − f), where f ∈ (0, 1).
This is the step of ‘forgetting’. As often as forgetting
procedure takes place the current value of dispersion σ is
evaluated which is then fixed during next Nf fights. The
number of such updates of σ is Niter . Then, the total
number of fights during one simulation is NfNiter
2III. RESULTS
The parameters of the calculations are: the system size
N , the number of fights Nf between the subsequent up-
dates of σ, the number of steps Niter and the change
ε of the power hi. The initial distribution of hi ap-
pears also to be relevant. This is set either random
(hi ∈ [−N/2, N/2]), or homogeneous, i.e. hi = iε for
all i, or delta-like, i.e. hi = 0 for all i. We keep ε = 0.01.
The output of the simulation is the critical value of f ,
i.e. fC , where σ changes abruptly. We can speak about
‘hierarchical’ (large σ) or ‘egalitarian’ (small σ) society.
As a rule, for small f we get hierarchy, and for large f
— equality.
It appears that fC depends on the ratio between N
and Nf . Keeping Nf constant and increasing N , we
make forgetting more and more relevant, because each
agent fights less between subsequent forgettings. Then,
the critical value fC decreases with N , as shown in Fig.
1(a). We can compensate this variation, changing Nf
and N simultaneously as to keep fC constant. Two se-
ries of this procedure are shown in Figs. 1(b) and 1(c),
for fC = 0.3 and fC = 0.5. In Fig. 2, we show two
respective curves of Nf against N .
We note that the obtained values of σ are stable vs
time, because the distribution of the agent’s power hi
stabilize after some transient time. Examples of this dy-
namics are shown in Fig. 3 for various values of the
parameters.
According to what was said above, the system size of
the critical value of forgetting parameter fC(N) decreases
to zero for large N . The character of this variation is
shown in Fig. 4. It is likely that there is a power-like
behavior, i.e. fC ∝ N
−α, with α ≈ 0.88.
For small systems, the final value of σ does not de-
pend on the initial distribution of hi. However, above
N = 175 the final distribution of hi shows some hys-
teretic behavior, i.e. σ does depend on initial values of
hi. In Fig. 5 we show the curves σ(f) obtained for ran-
dom, homogeneous or delta-like initial values of hi. The
curves, identical for N < 175, split abruptly for larger
systems. On the contrary, we checked that the hysteretic
effect is not observed in the approach in Ref. [5], at least
near the critical point reported there.
IV. DISCUSSION
In their seminal paper [3], the authors put several ex-
amples and suggestions on societies, which could self-
organize into the hierarchical state. There, reference are
given on animal societies, like bees, wasps, ants, chick-
ens, cows and ponies. A question arises how important
are spatial degrees of freedom in these societies. This is
a central task for our considerations, because the terri-
torial aspect of the problem of hierarchy is disregarded
here, while it was included in earlier work. It seems that
in small groups of some animals, the difference in hier-
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FIG. 1: Dependence of σ(f) for (a) fixed Nf = 10
4 and
different values of N and with tuned values of Nf for N-
independent values of fC : (b) fC = 0.3, (c) fC = 0.5.
archy is not to be here or there but rather to do this
or that. This is particularly true in societies of some
primates, as Pan troglodytes, Homo sapiens or Gorilla
gorilla [8, 9, 10].
The Bonabeau model, once released, lives with its own
life as it provides nontrivial questions on its mathematical
properties. However, its core is the sociological applica-
tion: description of a group of agents, possibly human,
which concentrate on their hierarchy. Such hierarchy ap-
pears in a natural way in sports competitions. For exam-
ple, each football league in the world produces one table
at the end of the season with the numbers of points and
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FIG. 2: Dependence of Nf (N) for different values of fC .
Linear fits are Nf = 105N + 7756 (fC = 0.5) and Nf =
46N + 4095 (fC = 0.3).
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FIG. 3: Time evolution of σ. Between subsequent σ evalua-
tions Nf fights take place.
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FIG. 4: Dependence of the critical value of the forgetting
parameter fC on the system size N for Nf = 50000. The
least-square fit fC(N) ∝ N
−0.88 to the last decade is included.
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
σ
f
(a) N=100, Niter=300
t=0:
Nf=10000: hi=0
homogeneous
random
Nf=21500: hi=0
homogeneous
random
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
σ
f
(b) N=500, Niter=300
t=0:
Nf=10
4: hi=0
random
Nf=10
5: hi=0
random
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6
σ
f
(c) Nf=104, Niter=300
t=0:
N=400: hi=0
random
N=200: hi=0
random
N=150: hi=0
random
N=100: hi=0
random
FIG. 5: (a) Final values of σ in small societies (N = 100) do
not depend on an initial distribution of hi. Different values of
Nf do not alter this result but shift the critical value fC . (b)
When system is large enough (N = 500), the critical point
fC for given number of fights Nf depends on the initial con-
ditions. (c) The initial inequality influences the critical point
for N ≥ 175.
goals for each team. Usually, the extremes at the top
and the bottom have widely spaces points, while in the
center the average teams differ just by one point. This is
not dissimilar to the power distribution of the Bonabeau
model [6].
How important is the hierarchy for the agents, depends
on their experience and social environment. Except army
and some universities, we are interested in formation of
4a society rather egalitarian than hierarchical, and tasks
of educational organizations following this attitude are
well known [11]. In the Bonabeau model, these efforts
get a well-defined purpose: to be on the right side of the
transition.
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